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Abstract Proper equilibrium plays a prominent role in the literature on non-
cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment in which the players play
a passive role is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamen-
tal idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than
innocuous ones. In this paper, we introduce a more active role for the players, leading
to the refinement of fall back proper equilibrium.
Keywords Proper equilibrium · Fall back proper equilibrium
Mathematics Subject Classification 91A10
1 Introduction: proper equilibrium and its thought experiment
In this paper, we reconsider the concept of proper equilibrium (Myerson 1978) in
mixed extensions of finite strategic games, from now on just abbreviated to games.
To adequately state our purposes and ideas, we first recall the underlying framework
and basic notation and definitions. A game is given by G = (N , {Mi }i∈N , {π i }i∈N ),
with N = {1, . . . , n} the player set, Mi the mixed strategy space of player i ∈ N ,
with Mi = {1, . . . ,mi } the set of pure strategies, and π i : ∏ j∈N M j → R the von
Neumann Morgenstern expected payoff function of player i . A pure strategy k ∈ Mi
of player i is alternatively denoted by eik , a typical element of Mi by x
i . We denote
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the probability which xi assigns to pure strategy k by xik . The set of all strategy profiles
is given by  = ∏i∈N Mi , a typical element of  by x .
The most fundamental concept in games is that of Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951).
A strategy profile x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of G, denoted by x̂ ∈ NE(G), if π i (x̂) ≥
π i (xi , x̂−i ) for all xi ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N . Here, (xi , x̂−i ) is the frequently used
shorthand notation for the strategy profile (x̂1, . . . , x̂ i−1, xi , x̂ i+1, . . . , x̂n).
The set of Nash equilibria may be very large and can contain counterintuitive
outcomes. Selten (1965) introduced the concept of perfect equilibrium as a refinement
of the set of Nash equilibria. The essential idea in the thought experiment underlying
perfect equilibrium is that no pure strategy should ever be given zero probability,
since there is always a small chance that any pure strategy might be chosen, if only by
mistake. To further refine the set of (perfect) equilibria, Myerson (1978) introduced
the concept of proper equilibrium.
Definition 1.1 (Myerson 1978) Let G = (N , {Mi }i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) be an n-player
game. A strategy profile x ∈  is a proper equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence
{εt }t∈N of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {xt }t∈N of com-














⇒ xit, ≤ εt x it,k
for all k,  ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N .
The properness concept plays an important role in the game theoretic literature and
is widely studied in various directions, see, e.g., van Damme (1984), García-Jurado
and Prada-Sánchez (1990), Blume et al. (1991), Yamamoto (1993) and Schuhmacher
(1999). In the equilibrium refinement literature, it is featured most prominently in
the work on stable sets (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986; Mertens 1989; Hillas 1990 and
Mertens (1991)), as each stable set contains a proper equilibrium. The attractiveness
of the properness concept is mainly based on the fact that this concept selects the
intuitively appealing strategy combinations in many (well-known) games (see, e.g.,
Myerson 1978; van Damme 1991). Moreover, properness captures the extensive form
notion of sequential rationality (van Damme 1984). In that sense, we recognize the
selective power of proper equilibrium. In our opinion, however, the definition and
underlying thought experiment of proper equilibrium are somewhat unsatisfying.
In the thought experiment underlying properness the idea is that, just as in the
thought experiment underlying perfectness, players make mistakes. Contrary to the
concept of perfectness, however, these mistakes are not made randomly; the trembles
are somehow sensible, meaning that innocuous mistakes are made with a significantly
higher probability than mistakes that have a substantial negative impact on the payoff
of the players. However, in the thought experiment players have a passive role in the
sense that they do not consciously decide on (an ordering of the) alternatives to their
preferred strategies. More precisely, in the thought experiment underlying properness
the alternatives are exogenously ordered based on the corresponding payoffs (given
the opponent’s strategies). Hence, what is missing is an appropriate justification for
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obtaining this specific ordering. This problem is also addressed in van Damme (1991)
who shows that the use of control costs does not provide such a justification. We
provide a justification for the fundamental idea underlying properness by starting out
from a different, active, thought experiment.
In this alternative approach, each player in the thought experiment is conscious of
the fact that both his intended strategy and the intended strategies of his opponents
might not be executed. In this approach, we then explicitly model how each player
actively anticipates on the occurrence of such events. More specifically, in this thought
experiment all the actions of each player are blocked exogenously with a small but
positive probability. Since each player wants to play a best reply, each player has to
strategically decide beforehand on a back-up action in case his first choice is blocked.
However, since this back-up actionmight be blocked as well, he also has to decide on a
second back-up action in case the first back-up action turns out to be unavailable, and so
forth and so on. Hence, each player must decide on a complete ordering of his actions
beforehand. The probability with which a player is unable to play a certain action is
assumed to be independent of the particular choice he makes. This probability may,
however, vary between players. We stress that players are not given the opportunity
to block each other’s actions, but rather that actions can be blocked exogenously. The
common ground with proper is that some exogenous event occurs (mistake/blocking),
but the difference lies in what happens after that event. In proper, players somehow
accidentally coordinate their mistakes, whereas in our setting the players have to
consciouslymake a contingency plan in case their first choice turns out to be impossible
for whatever reason (which we call “blocked”).
The described thought experiment results in the concept of fall back proper equilib-
rium, which alternatively can be seen as a hierarchical extension to the concept of fall
back equilibrium, introduced by Kleppe et al. (2012) and further discussed in Kleppe
et al. (2013). In the original fall back equilibrium concept, a player’s pure strategy in
the fall back game is an intended pure strategy in the original game, backup up by
a single fall back choice rather than a complete hierarchy. Although fall back proper
equilibrium is an extension of the idea behind fall back equilibrium, the two solutions
are logically unrelated (cf. Kleppe 2010).
Another refinement concept that is also based on a thought experiment with a
more active anticipation concept is the notion of informationally robust equilibrium as
introduced by Robson (1994) and further elaborated upon by Reijnierse et al. (2007).
To formalize the concept of fall back proper equilibrium, we introduce some addi-
tional notation. The action set in the fall back proper game for player i ∈ N within the
thought experiment described above equals the set of all orderings of the action set
Mi , and is denoted by i . Hence, the total number of actions in the fall back proper
game for player i equals m̃i = mi !. A typical element of i is denoted by σ , where
the action on position s of σ is given by σ(s) ∈ Mi . A pure strategy σ ∈ i will
alternatively be denoted by eiσ . By 
i
k ⊆ i , k ∈ Mi , we denote the set of orderings
of Mi for which σ(1) = k, hence ik = {σ ∈ i | σ(1) = k}. The mixed strategy
space of player i is given by i .
We assume that each action of player i is blockedwith the same probability, denoted
by εi , but we allow for different probabilities among the players. Hence, let ε =
123
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(ε1, . . . , εn) be an n-tuple of (small) non-negative probabilities. If player i plays
action σ ∈ i in the fall back proper game, he plays with probability (1− εi )(εi )s−1
action σ(s) of the game G for s ∈ {1, . . . , |mi |}. With probability (εi )mi , all actions
of player i are blocked, the game is not played and the payoff to all players is defined
to be zero.
The fall back proper game G̃(ε) = (N , {i }i∈N , {π iε}i∈N ) is the mixed extension
of the corresponding finite game with m̃i pure strategies for each player i ∈ N . The
payoff functions {π iε}i∈N on mixed strategy combinations in i∈Ni are derived in
the standard way using expected payoffs from the payoff functions on pure strategy
combinations in i∈Ni , as described by
π iε((e
j












for all i ∈ N . The residual probability in which at least one player is unable to play
any of his actions is implicitly incorporated in this payoff function, as in that case
the payoff to every player is zero. Note that the zero payoff is arbitrary and will not
influence the equilibria of the game, because it does not depend on the players’ strategy
choices.
A typical element of i is denoted by ρ
i , and the probability which ρi assigns
to pure strategy σ is given by ρiσ . The set of all strategy profiles is given by ̃ =∏
i∈N i , an element of ̃ by ρ.
Definition 1.2 Let G = (N , {Mi }i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) be an n-player game. A strategy
profile x ∈  is a fall back proper equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence {εt }t∈N
of n-tuples of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {ρt }t∈N such





k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N . The set of fall back proper equilibria of a game G is denoted
by FBPR(G).
In the thought experiment underlying fall back proper equilibrium, all the actions of
each player are blockedwith a small but positive probability. Therefore, players decide
beforehand on a complete ordering of their actions. This is modeled by letting players
play the fall back proper game in which each action consists of a full ordering of the
actions of the original game such that the first action is played with a probability close
to one and each following action with a smaller probability of a fixed factor. A fall
back proper equilibrium of the original game is then deduced from the limit point of
a sequence of Nash equilibria of the corresponding fall back proper games when the
blocking probabilities converge to zero.
Fall back proper equilibrium can be seen as a hierarchical extension of fall back
equilibrium1 (Kleppe et al. 2012), in which players are only allowed to use a single
backup action. As a result, one might think that the set of fall back proper equilibria
1 In the fall back game (Kleppe et al. 2012), the pure actions are constructed as the combination of first and
second choices in the original game, with the payoff functions adopted accordingly. Fall back equilibria are
then defined analagous to Definition 1.2.
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refines the set of fall back equilibria. We refer to Kleppe (2010) for an example which
shows that this is not the case.
This paper shows that fall back proper equilibrium is a refinement of proper equilib-
rium. So, interestingly, themore active thought experiment underlying fall back proper
equilibrium sheds some new light on the original, more passive thought experiment
underlying proper equilibrium.We show that the two concepts coincide for two-player
games. In general, fall back proper constitutes a refinement of proper, where designing
an example where the concepts differ requires an intricate construction.
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we provide an
alternative characterization of fall back proper equilibrium based only on limitations
of the strategy spaces. Using that characterization, we show in Sect. 3 that the set of
fall back proper equilibria is a (possibly strict) non-empty and closed subset of the set
of proper equilibria, and in Sect. 4 that for two-player games the sets of proper and
fall back proper equilibria coincide. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 A characterization of fall back proper equilibrium
In this section, we provide an alternative characterization of fall back proper equi-
librium in which the perturbations of the thought experiment are fully captured by
limitations of the strategy spaces. This allows for a perturbed game of the same
dimensions as the original one. For a (sufficiently small) blocking vector δ ∈ RN+ ,
the blocking game G(δ) = (N , {Mi (δi )}i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) is defined to be the game
which only differs from G = (N , {Mi }i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) in the sense that the strategy










1 − (δi )|T i |





for all i ∈ N , with the domains of the payoff functions restricted accordingly. We
define the set of all strategy profiles of the blocking game by (δ) =  j∈NM j (δ j ).
Note that this blocking game gives themaximum probability bywhich each number
of actions can be played, e.g., if player i puts the maximum allowed probability on
the actions in a set T i , then any other strategy k /∈ T i can be played with a probability
of at most (1 − δi )(δi )|T i |.
Lemma 2.1 Let G = (N , {Mi }i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) be an n-player game. Let δ ∈
R
N+ be a blocking vector, and let G̃(δ) = (N , {i }i∈N , {π iδ}i∈N ) and G(δ) =
(N , {Mi (δi )}i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) be the corresponding fall back proper and blocking
game, respectively. Then, there exists an onto map fδ : ̃ → (δ) such that
π iδ(ρ) = π i ( fδ(ρ)) ·  j∈N (1 − (δ j )m
j
) for all ρ ∈ ̃ and all i ∈ N.
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Proof We explicitly construct a map fδ satisfying the conditions of the lemma. Let
ρ ∈ ̃. We define fδ(ρ) = x , with
xik =
∑
σ∈i (1 − δi )(δi )σ−1(k)−1ρiσ
1 − (δi )mi
for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N . By considering themost extreme case inwhichρiσ is a pure
strategy in the fall backproper game, it is readily checked that
∑
k∈T i xik ≤
1 − (δi )|T i |
1 − (δi )mi
for all T i ⊆ Mi such that x ∈ (δ). Furthermore, the probabilities put by strategy
profile x on all the action profiles in the game G are equal to the probabilities put
by ρ on these action profiles multiplied by
1
 j∈N (1 − (δ j )m j )
. Hence, π iδ(ρ) =
π i (x) ·  j∈N (1 − (δ j )m j ) = π i ( fδ(ρ)) ·  j∈N (1 − (δ j )m j ) for all i ∈ N . Finally, it
is readily checked that fδ is onto. 	
As a consequence of Lemma 2.1, a fall back proper equilibrium can also be defined
in terms of a sequence of Nash equilibria of blocking games.
Theorem 2.1 Let G = (N , {Mi }i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) be an n-player game. Then, a strat-
egy profile x ∈  is a fall back proper equilibrium of G if and only if there exists a
sequence {δt }t∈N of blocking vectors of positive real numbers converging to zero and
a sequence {xt }t∈N converging to x such that xt ∈ NE(G(δt )) for all t ∈ N.
Proof We just prove the “only if” part, the reverse statement can be shownanalogously.
Assume x̂ ∈ FBPR(G). Then by definition, there exists a sequence {δt }t∈N of n-tuples
of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {ρ̂t }t∈N converging to




σ for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N , such that ρ̂t ∈ NE(G̃(δt ))
for all t ∈ N. By Lemma 2.1, there exists a sequence {x̂t }t∈N converging to x̂ ∈ ,
with x̂t ∈ (δt ) for all t ∈ N, such that π i (x̂t ) =
π iδt (ρ̂t )
 j∈N (1 − (δ j )m j )
for all i ∈ N
and all t ∈ N.
Let i ∈ N . We show that π i (x̂t ) ≥ π i (xit , x̂−it ) for all xit ∈ Mi (δit ) and all t ∈ N,
which proves that x̂t ∈ NE(G(δt )) for all t ∈ N and, therefore, completes the proof.
Let t ∈ N and let (xit , x̂−it ) ∈ (δt ). Then by Lemma 2.1, we can take a strategy
(ρit , ρ̂
−i
t ) ∈ ̃ such that π iδt (ρit , ρ̂−it ) = π i (xit , x̂−it ) ·  j∈N (1 − (δ j )m
j
).
Since ρ̂t ∈ NE(G̃(δt )), we obtain













 j∈N (1 − (δ j )m j )
= π i (x̂t ).
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Consequently, π i (x̂t ) ≥ π i (xit , x̂−it ) for all xit ∈ Mi (δit ) and all t ∈ N. 	
Note that it immediately follows from Theorem 2.1 that each completely mixed Nash
equilibrium is a fall back proper equilibrium.
3 General results
In this section, we show that the set of fall back proper equilibria is a (possibly strict)
non-empty and closed subset of the set of proper equilibria.
Theorem 3.1 Let G be an n-player game. Then, each fall back proper equilibrium of
G is a proper equilibrium of G.
Proof Let G = (N , {Mi }i∈N , {π i }i∈N ) be an n-player game and let x ∈ FBPR(G).
Then by Theorem 2.1, there exists a sequence {δt }t∈N of blocking vectors converging
to zero, and a sequence {xt }t∈N such that xt ∈ NE(G(δt )) for all t ∈ N, converging to
x ∈ .
Let the sequence {εt }t∈N be given by εt = maxi∈N δit for all t ∈ N. Let i ∈ N and let
π i (ei, x
−i
t̂
) < π i (eik, x
−i
t̂
) for some k,  ∈ Mi and some t̂ ∈ N. Since xt ∈ NE(G(δt ))








≤ εt̂ x it̂,k .
Consequently, {εt }t∈N is a sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero
and {xt }t∈N is a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles converging to x such













⇒ xit, ≤ εt x it,k
for all k,  ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N . Hence, x is a proper equilibrium. 	
Hence, the set of fall back proper equilibria is a subset of the set of proper equilibria.
The following theorem states that this subset is non-empty and closed.
Theorem 3.2 Let G be an n-player game. Then, the set of fall back proper equilibria
of G is non-empty and closed.
Proof We first show non-emptiness. Let {δt }t∈N be a sequence of blocking vectors
converging to zero. Take a sequence {xt }t∈N such that xt ∈ NE(G(δt )) for all t ∈ N.
Since the strategy spaces are compact, there exists a subsequence of {xt }t∈N converging
to, say, x ∈ . By Theorem 2.1, x ∈ FBPR(G).
Secondly, we show that FBPR(G) is closed. Take a converging sequence {xt }t∈N
with xt ∈ FBPR(G) for all t ∈ N, with limit x . For all t ∈ N there exists a sequence
{δtr }r∈N of blocking vectors converging to zero and a sequence {xtr }r∈N converging
to xt such that
xtr ∈ NE(G(δtr ))
for all r ∈ N. Considering the sequences {δt t }t∈N and {xtt }t∈N, one readily establishes
that x ∈ FBPR(G).
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Using a quite specific construction, the following example is designed to show that
the set of fall back proper equilibria can be a strict subset of the set of proper
equilibria.
Example 3.1 Consider the following three-player game G in which the third player






















e11 10, 10, 10 0, 10, 0 0, 2, 0 0, 0, 0
e12 10, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e13 2, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e14 1, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 1






















e11 0, 0, 10 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e12 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e13 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e14 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0






















e11 0, 0, 2 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e12 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1, 0, 0
e13 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e14 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0






















e11 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e12 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e13 0, 0, 0 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e14 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0







In this example, it is possible to coordinate the probabilities on the lower-level
actions in such a way that x = (e11, e21, e31) is a proper equilibrium. This type of
coordination is, however, not possible in the thought experiment underlying fall back
proper equilibrium, as players are not free to make these lower-level mistakes that
just happen to make things work, as their assumed active role requires them to play a
(hierarchical) best reply.
Consider the sequence {εt }t∈N, with εt = 2t for all t ∈ N, converging to zero and the







)e11+ 1t e12+ 1t2 e13+ 1t3 e14+ 1t5 e15, x̄2t = (1− 1t − 1t2 − 1t3 )e21+ 1t e22+ 1t2 e23+ 1t3 e24
and x̄3t = (1− 1t − 1t2 − 1t3 )e31 + 1t e32 + 1t2 e33 + 1t3 e34. Then, x̄t is εt -proper for all t ∈ N
and, hence, x is a proper equilibrium.
If x were a fall back proper equilibrium, there should exist a sequence {δt }t∈N of
blocking vectors converging to zero and a sequence {x̂t }t∈N converging to x such that
x̂t ∈ NE(G(δt )) for all t ∈ N. Hence, for a t ∈ N sufficiently large it should hold
that π1(e11, x̂
−1
t ) ≥ π1(e12, x̂−1t ), π2(e21, x̂−2t ) ≥ π2(e22, x̂−2t ) and π3(e31, x̂−3t ) ≥
π3(e32, x̂
−3
t ). However, note that π
1(e11, x̂
−1
t ) ≥ π1(e12, x̂−1t ) implies that δ3t ≥ δ2t ,
π2(e21, x̂
−2
t ) ≥ π2(e22, x̂−2t ) implies that δ1t ≥ δ3t and π3(e31, x̂−3t ) ≥ π3(e32, x̂−3t )
implies that δ2t ≥ 4δ1t . Combining all this results in δ1t ≥ 4δ1t , which is not possible
for δ1t > 0. Consequently, x is not a fall back proper equilibrium.
To understand why x is proper but not fall back proper, focus on player 3. To check
whether player 3 puts maximum probability on e31 rather than e
3
2, we should check his
payoffs for all pure strategies for players 1 and 2, since in both thought experiments
each player plays a completely mixed strategy. Scanning the payoff trimatrices, it
follows that the strategy profiles y = (e14, e24, e31) and z = (e15, e23, e32) are important.
Informally, to check whether x is fall back proper, the fall back strategy profiles y
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and z are equally important for player 3 since twice a fourth choice (e14, e
2
4) has the
same number of factors δ as one fifth and one third choice (e15, e
2
3).
2 As a result, the
4 at z trumps the 1 at y and consequently, x is not fall back proper. Nevertheless, we
can still construct a sequence of xt supporting x as a proper equilibrium. We only
have to take care that player 1’s fifth choice (his worst pure strategy) is played with a
sufficiently small probability to neutralise the 4 in z. In fall back proper equilibrium,
it is not allowed to coordinate small probabilities on specific deviations in the game.
Note that to make the construction in Example 3.1 work, we need the three payoffs
of 10 (one per player) outside the proper equilibrium. For the remaining payoffs in
the trimatrix, we actually have some slack, as can be seen from the final inequality,
δ1t ≥ 4δ1t . If you replace the 4 by any constant larger than 1, the same contradiction
follows. As a result, the class of games for which the concepts of proper equilibrium
and fall back proper equilibrium do not coincide does not have measure zero.
4 Results for two-player games
In the previous section, we showed that in general the set of fall back proper equilibria
is a (possibly strict) subset of the set of proper equilibria. Interestingly, for two-player
games the sets of proper and fall back proper equilibria coincide.
Theorem 4.1 Let G be a two-player game. Then, the sets of proper and fall back
proper equilibria of G coincide.
Proof Let G = ({1, 2}, {Mi }i∈{1,2}, {π i }i∈{1,2}) be a two-player game. Since
FBPR(G) ⊆ PR(G) for all n-player games (Theorem 3.1), we only have to show
that PR(G) ⊆ FBPR(G). Let x ∈ PR(G). Then, there exists a sequence {εt }t∈N of
positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {xt }t∈N of completely mixed













⇒ xit, ≤ εt x it,k
for all k,  ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N .
Let i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ N.Wedivide the actions of player i recursively in a finite num-
ber Sit of best reply sets such that Q
i
t (s) = {k ∈ Mi\∪r∈{1,...,s−1} Qit (r) | π i (eik, x jt ) ≥
π i (ei, x
j
t ) for all  ∈ Mi\∪r∈{1,...,s−1} Qit (r)} for all s ∈ {1, . . . , Sit }. Note that since
xt is εt -proper, xit, ≤ εt x it,k for all k ∈ Qit (s) and  ∈ Qit (s′) with s < s′.










if k ∈ Qit (s),
0 otherwise.
2 Formally, we need additional but similar arguments for the other two players to ensure that there is no
loophole by choosing different δs for the players.
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Hence, x̄ it (s) is a strategy in which actions outside Q
i
t (s) are not played and the
probabilities on the actions in Qit (s) are relatively the same as in x
i
t .
Let δit = εt for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N. Then, we construct for each t ∈ N the
strategy x̂t such that
x̂ it =
∑Sit
s=1((1 − δit )
∑b+|Qit (s)|
a=b (δit )a)x̄ it (s)
1 − (δit )mi
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, with b = | ∪r<s Qit (r)|.
It follows that the sequence {x̂t }t∈N converges to x and that x̂t ∈ (δt ) for all t ∈ N.
It remains to be shown that for all i ∈ {1, 2} and all t ∈ N, π i (x̂t ) ≥ π i (ẋ it , x̂−it ) for all
ẋ it ∈ Mi (δit ). Since each player has only one opponent, for all i ∈ {1, 2} and all  ∈
Mi , {k ∈ Mi | π i (eik, x−it ) ≥ π i (ei, x−it )} = {k ∈ Mi | π i (eik, x̂−it ) ≥ π i (ei, x̂−it )}.
Hence, let i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ N, and let k ∈ Qit (s) and  ∈ Qit (s′), with s < s′. Then,
there is number U ∈ {1, . . . , S−it } such that
π i (eik, x̄
−i
t (u)) = π i (ei, x̄−it (u))
for all 1 ≤ u < U , and
π i (eik, x̄
−i




This implies that in x̂t player i recursively puts the maximum allowed probability
on each following best reply level. Consequently, π i (x̂t ) ≥ π i (ẋ it , x̂−it ) for all ẋ it ∈
Mi (δ
i
t ). Therefore, x ∈ FBPR(G). 	
5 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a new thought experiment with an active fall back role for the
players to put into new light the concept of proper equilibrium, which has been crit-
icised in the literature (e.g., van Damme 1991) for the passive role of the players in
its original thought experiment. Although technically, the concepts of fall back proper
and proper do not always coincide, an example showing that the two concepts differ
needs a rather specific, intricate design.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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